Four years after the beginning of the Great Recession, the labor market remains historically weak. Many observers have concluded that "structural" impediments to recovery bear some of the blame. This paper reviews such structural explanations. I find that there is little evidence supporting these hypotheses, and that the bulk of the evidence is more consistent with the hypothesis that continued poor performance is primarily attributable to shortfalls in the aggregate demand for labor.
I. Introduction
In a 2004 speech titled "The Great Moderation", Ben Bernanke -then a member of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve but soon to become the chairmandiscussed the apparently substantial decline in macroeconomic volatility over the last decades of the 20 th century. He argued that this was in important part attributable to improved monetary policy, and he expressed optimism that the moderation would persist into the future (Bernanke 2004) .
Within four years of that speech, the U.S. had fallen into the "Great Recession." (The prior record was 26 months, in 1981-83.) Moreover, while the unemployment rate has begun to decline, much of the recent decline reflects reduced labor force participation rather than increased employment. The male employment-to-population ratio, which fell by an unprecedented 7.1 percentage points between December 2006 and December 2009, hovered around 64 percent -nearly four percentage points lower than had ever been recorded before the current cycle -for the subsequent two years, and has only recently begun to recover slowly.
Economists will be debating the causes and interpretations of this cycle for decades to come. Current views about the state of the labor market can be divided into two rough camps, though of course there is heterogeneity of opinion within each one.
One camp, of which Paul Krugman is perhaps the most prominent member (see also Romer 2011) , argues that recent poor outcomes are primarily reflective of a shortfall of aggregate demand. This camp prescribes aggressively stimulative monetary policywhich would have to take unconventional forms, as the federal funds rate has been at or near its zero lower bound since late 2008 -and additional fiscal stimulus to raise effective demand.
A second camp points to "structural" factors as important impediments to labor market recovery. This diagnosis comes in several flavors. Some focus on mismatch between the types of labor supplied by workers and the types demanded by employers.
As Narayana Kocherlakota, President of the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, described it in a 2010 speech, "Firms have jobs, but can't find appropriate workers. The workers want to work, but can't find appropriate jobs. There are many possible sources of mismatch-geography, skills, demography-and they are probably all at work" (Kocherlakota 2010 ).
Others focus on workers' labor supply decisions. For example, Mulligan (2009;  see also Mulligan, 2011a) concludes that reductions in labor supply, due either to changing worker preferences or to increases in labor market distortions, explain much or all of the decline in employment in 2008. Mulligan (2011b) points to a particular source of such distortions, noting that safety net spending has increased dramatically over the last several years.
The common element of the various structural explanations is that they posit that, as expressed by participants at the January 2012 Federal Reserve Board Open Markets
Committee meeting, "a substantial part of the increase in unemployment since the beginning of the recession reflected factors other than a shortfall in aggregate demand." 2 These explanations thus generally militate against activist policies aimed at spurring labor demand. Kocherlakota (2010) concludes that " [m] ost of the existing unemployment represents mismatch that is not readily amenable to monetary policy,"
while Mulligan (2011b) suggests that countercyclical fiscal policies like unemployment insurance extensions that reduce the private return to employment may slow rather than hasten recovery. To the extent that the primary labor market problem is structural, policy solutions would have to fall on the labor supply side: Depending on the specific source of the structural problems, one might want to emphasize job training, mobility assistance, or reductions in effective labor income tax rates.
This paper reviews labor market data with an eye toward assessing the plausibility of structural explanations for recent performance. 3 I focus on short-run labor market dynamics, distinguishing structural hypotheses about these dynamics from the related but distinct hypothesis that long-run, slow-moving structural trends in our economy have harmed some groups and helped others. 4 (For example, Autor and Dorn, 2011 , argue that technical change since 1980 has worked to the disadvantage of middle-skill workers in occupations requiring "routine" work that can be easily computerized; see also Reich, 1992 .) This is not to say that long-run structural trends are not of interest for my analysis. They are relevant insofar as these trends can help to explain the collapse in labor market outcomes between 2007 and 2011 or the prospects for labor market recovery in response to aggregate demand increases. For example, long-run declines in labor market flexibility might have been expected to slow job losses during the downturn but also to prolong the labor market recovery after demand returns.
I examine the various forms of evidence that have been seen as indicating structural problems. I also propose a new source of information about the importance of structural impediments to labor market recovery. Importantly, most structural explanations for our current predicament (though not changes in adjustment costs) imply that the labor market appears tight from the perspective of some or all potential employers: Despite high measured unemployment, there are relatively few workers who are both interested in and qualified for the jobs on offer. Employers facing tight labor 3 Diamond (2010) examines different evidence than that considered here but comes to a similar conclusion, as do Mishel, Shierholz, and Edwards (2010) and Mishel (2011) . The Congressional Budget Office (2012) is more favorable toward structural hypotheses but nevertheless concludes that aggregate demand shortfalls are the primary source of the high unemployment rate. Sahin, Song, Topa, and Violante (2011) conclude that acrossindustry mismatch is more important than the data reviewed here indicate. 4 I set aside until Section VIII the hypothesis that extended cyclical unemployment might eventually become structural, as idle workers' human capital gradually depreciates, except insofar as this hysteresis has already taken place to a sufficient degree to represent an important impediment to rapid recovery. markets should bid up the wage in order to attract workers. Labor demand shortfalls, by contrast, would have an opposite effect, as unemployed workers to bid down equilibrium wages as they compete for the few available jobs. 5 I thus emphasize the examination of wage trends for evidence of structural impediments to growth.
Section II begins by reviewing the state of the labor market. Section III develops a specific definition of "structural" impediments to labor market recovery and argues for the value of price as well as quantity data in identifying such impediments. Sections IV through VII explore the various forms of available evidence: Aggregate data on GDP and the job openings rate (Section IV); estimates of the effects of Unemployment
Insurance extensions (Section V); wages for newly-hired workers (Section VI); and the long-term unemployment share (Section VII). Section VIII concludes. Of course, the failure of wages to fall quickly in response to labor demand shortfalls is a longstanding and still unresolved puzzle; see, e.g., Bewley (1999) . information, finance, and real estate, have continued to lose jobs, though much more slowly than in the earlier period. Government employment, which grew slightly in the first two years of the recession, has declined more recently, led by states and local governments.
II. The state of the labor market
Construction and manufacturing employment is heavily male and largely noncollege-educated, so one might expect that low-skill men would have suffered 6 I focus on December to December comparisons to avoid seasonal adjustment concerns. All changes are expressed as shares of employment in the industry in December 2007. 7 This of course does not rule out the idea that a shock that began in the financial sector was the source of the general collapse in demand.
disproportionately in the recession. Figure 3 shows the unemployment rate by gender and education in 2007 and in 2011. Consistent with the industrial composition of the cyclical collapse, we see that unemployment rates of less educated men rose more than did those of more educated men. However, it is notable that low-skill workers had much higher unemployment rates than high-skill workers even in 2007, and that unemployment rates rose dramatically for low-skill women as well as for men. Indeed, across all eight gender-education groups, unemployment rates in 2011 were roughly double their 2007 levels.
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Once more, this appears more consistent with a cyclical decline than with structural shifts that favor particular subgroups.
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One deviation from the general doubling is that unemployment rates rose by somewhat more (in percentage terms) for men than for women at each education level.
This pattern has led some commentators to refer to the Great Recession as a "mancession." Similarly, some have concluded from the extremely high unemployment rates among young people -14.4% in December 2011 for those aged 20-24 -that dysfunctional labor market institutions are effectively reserving jobs for insiders.
However, it is not clear that the current cycle is unusual in these regards. The construction and manufacturing sectors have historically been more cyclical than the economy as a whole, and so one would expect low-skilled men to suffer more in any downturn. Similarly, youth unemployment has always been highly sensitive to economic conditions (Clark and Summers 1982) . Figure 3 shows that the male unemployment rate was lower than the female rate in three of the four education groups in 2007 and in two out of four in 2011. Nevertheless, the overall male unemployment rate was higher in each year, as men have less education, on average, than do women.
magnitude of the cycle. 9 To form this prediction, for each group g I estimate a time series regression of the form:
where u gt is the unemployment rate for group g in month t and u (-g) anomalies. First, contrary to many discussions of the housing bust, construction industry unemployment -which is extremely cyclical -has risen by 1.5 percentage points less than would be expected given the weak overall labor market, and the anomaly in durable goods manufacturing is more than twice as large. In contrast, unemployment has risen more than predicted in the usually less cyclical agriculture, information, finance, real estate, professional services, education, and health industries. Insofar as there have been structural shifts, they have apparently been toward the goods-producing industries and away from the high-skill services, though these shifts have been masked by the acrossthe-board cyclical decline.
Turning to Figure 5 , the unemployment rate for men without high school diplomas -again, a group that is ordinarily very cyclically sensitive -has risen by 1.4
percentage points less than expected, while women's unemployment rates have risen slightly more than expected. The term "man-cession" is thus wholly inappropriate, as at 9 Unemployed workers are assigned to the industry in which they last worked. 10 I compute u (-g)t using fixed weights for each group h!g over time, proportional to the group's average labor force share over the 1978 to 2011 period. 11 Results are similar if I instead predict the change as the difference between the predicted 2011 rate and the actual 2007 rate,
least as of 2011 the recession has hit women unusually hard. 12 Finally, Figure 6 indicates that over-65 workers, whose unemployment rate has risen less than have those of younger workers, have nevertheless been much more affected by this business cycle than by past cycles. 13 These data suggest that many of the gender, industry, and age patterns that have been the focus of public discussions are simple characteristics of severe recessions and not unique to this one.
Another important source of heterogeneity is geographic. The recession has hit some areas -most famously, Sun Belt cities like Las Vegas where the housing boom was most pronounced -harder than others. Figure 7 shown a bit more heterogeneity than did those in the initial collapse, but the labor market 12 One possible explanation for the spread of the idea that the recession was uneven in its impacts is that outcomes as of 2009 were a bit different than those seen in 2011. But even in 2009 the unemployment rate for non-high-school men was a bit lower than would have been expected based on past patterns, while for more educated men the excess unemployment was quite small. 13 Of course, unemployment rate changes combine changes in employment and in labor force participation. The over-65 anomaly in Figure 6 is much reduced when I instead examine the employment-population ratio, suggesting that much of the anomaly reflects increased labor force participation in this group, perhaps related to collapses in retirement account values due to equity market declines. By contrast, the labor force participation of less-educated men appears to have fallen by more than expected given the severity of the recession.
is still quite depressed essentially across the board. This pattern appears consistent with a shortfall in aggregate labor demand, and less so with a gradual adjustment to a technological or demand-driven shock that changed the composition of labor demand.
III. A focus on structural explanations
Discussions of economic aggregates often distinguish between cyclical and structural components. The budget of a government with strong automatic stabilizers may swing from surplus to deficit as the economy weakens, then return to surplus during the recovery. Deficits observed during the downturn would generally be described as cyclical. By contrast, a government that ran a deficit even at the business cycle peak would generally be agreed to be running a structural deficit.
The distinction between cyclical and structural components becomes muddier, however, when one examines outcomes that are constituent of the business cycle itself. If we define the structural component of an outcome as the outcome when measured at a business cycle peak, then by definition there can be no structural component to the variables used to identify that peak. 14 For example, the employment-population ratio was In practice, discussions of structural components of labor market outcomes often use a different (though related) definition. Many commentators appear to describe as structural any labor market outcome that would not be improved by a balanced increase in labor demand to levels ordinarily seen in business cycle expansions. For example, if 14 If recessions are defined solely based on measured economic output, employment and unemployment are not mechanically related to cycle measurement. But it does not seem reasonable to define any unemployment observed while GDP is growing as prima facie structural. Many business cycle dating efforts recognize this by considering other measures. The NBER, for example, bases its decisions on "economic activity," considering various measures -including "economy-wide employment" -to assess this (NBER 2010) . Both of these examples make clear that structural and cyclical unemployment can coincide, and that declines in total employment can be consistent with either type. The distinguishing feature of structural unemployment is (the possibility of) tight labor markets even when employment remains below its potential. In other words, even if monetary or fiscal policy produced a balanced outward labor demand shift sufficient to restore the pre-shock wage level, employment would remain depressed. Larger demand shifts might in principle restore the employment level, but only with higher (and potentially inflationary) equilibrium wages.
Of course, these characteristics of structural unemployment might be impossible to observe so long as cyclical unemployment remains high. In the two-labor-markets example illustrated in Figure 8 , for example, I posited that the increase in demand for type B labor was large enough to offset the decline in type-A demand, at pre-shock wages. A more realistic characterization of recent history might involve a small decline in type-B demand accompanied by a larger decline for type A. The resulting rise in unemployment would have both structural and cyclical components.
In the next four sections, I investigate the available data for patterns that might support or contradict the hypothesis that structural factors contributed importantly to the slow labor market recovery in 2009-2011. I consider first the aggregate quantities data that have been most often interpreted as indicative of a structural problem, then discuss the evidence regarding labor supply disincentives, evidence from wage trends, and finally the long-term unemployment share.
IV. Aggregate Quantities: Okun's Law and the Beveridge Curve
Two macroeconomic phenomena that appeared relatively early in the Great Recession suggested that cyclical explanations might not be sufficient to explain the weakness of the labor market.
The first of these was that Okun's Law appeared to have been violated (Elsby, Hobijn, and Sahin, 2010) . A rule of thumb that has been useful in the past is that the unemployment rate rises by approximately 1% for every 2% that real output growth falls short of its potential. Early in the recession, there appeared to be a relatively large deviation from this historical pattern. Consider the period through the third quarter of percentage points is actually substantially smaller than the Okun's Law prediction of 4.4 percentage points. From the current vantage, the puzzle is that the unemployment rate is so low, not that it has not fallen enough. Of course, as the recent decline in the unemployment rate has overwhelmingly reflected falling labor force participation rather than rising employment, this is less of a puzzle than it first appears.
A second phenomenon that has been often interpreted as an indication of recent structural problems is an apparent shift in the Beveridge Curve that relates job openings to the unemployment rate. Figure 9 illustrates this curve, using job openings data from (Blanchard and Diamond, 1989) . 
A number of commentators have interpreted this apparent shift in the Beveridge
Curve as diagnostic of increases in structural unemployment. In this view, the rise in job openings indicates that labor demand has shifted outward, while the stability of the unemployment rate suggests that the currently unemployed are unable or unwilling to fill the newly created positions.
A number of objections might be raised against this inference: Nonlinearity of the Beveridge Curve might make it difficult to identify outward shifts while unemployment remains high; the unemployment rate may be a poor proxy for labor market tightness when there are many discouraged workers who are temporarily out of the labor force; or the rise in job openings might simply be part of a normal counterclockwise rotation of the Beveridge Curve in an economic recovery. 18 None of these, however, can explain more than a small share of the sustained apparent outward shift of the curve.
A more important concern is that measured job openings data and the openingsto-unemployment ratio are only loosely related to the efficiency of the economic matching process, particularly in an unprecedentedly long period of labor market weakness. This is because the definition of a job opening used by the JOLTS survey does not closely correspond to any economically meaningful concept. Thus, the increase in job openings provides at best weak support for the view that labor demand has increased substantially since 2009.
Job openings are well defined if hiring is a binary decision on the firm's part, as in many search models: Once a decision is made to hire another worker, a job opening is posted and the first applicant who arrives (perhaps subject to some well-defined, fixed minimum qualifications) is hired. This, of course, is not realistic. Both the wage and the required qualifications are choice variables that can influence the number of measured openings independent of actual labor demand. likely to remain open for longer than would a position offering w * . Similarly, the firm might hold out for better-qualified workers, extending its search, or might be less choosy in order to hire more quickly (Diamond 2010) . Either decision affects the number of measured job openings and the job filling rate, but neither reflects changes in labor market matching efficiency.
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19 Even when the offered wage is not posted with the job advertisement the employer must decide on a bargaining stance once an otherwise suitable candidate is identified. Similarly, the employer sets both minimum qualifications to list with the position and its choosiness among workers meeting those qualifications. Finally, a firm planning to hire may do so without ever posting an official opening (Diamond 2010) . 20 This is of course the exact analogue to the somewhat more common claim that unemployment is always voluntary: Unemployment simply means that one's reservation wage has been set above the market price. In search models, there can be frictional unemployment and frictional job openings. But even in these models one might observe a range of reservation wages and wage offers, with frictional unemployment rising in the former and frictional vacancies declining in the latter. 21 Davis, Faberman and Haltiwanger (2010) examine the related idea that the employer's choice of "recruiting intensity" can influence the rate at which vacancies are filled. However, they do not have a direct measure of recruiting intensity, and must proxy for it using the ratio of hires to vacancies. This makes it impossible to evaluate whether labor supply changes have altered the job filling rate that would be seen for a given labor demand and a fixed recruiting effort level.
These definitional issues may be unusually important now. In the past, employers seem to have been unwilling to take advantage of labor market weakness by offering lower wages to new hires than they have in the past, or by substantially increasing their required qualifications. The reasons for this are not well understood, but appear to include concerns about the morale of the newly-hired and the incumbent workers and worries that workers who accept low wages when business conditions are weak may be quite likely to leave the firm once conditions improve (Bewley, 1999) . The saliency of these concerns may be in decline: Anecdotally, two-tier wage structures that distinguish between incumbent and newly hired workers have become increasingly common (Vlasic 2011) , and in a downturn that is expected to be prolonged an employer may not worry as much about retaining its workers after the economy recovers.
If indeed employers are taking advantage of the weak labor market to reduce offered wages or to hire more qualified workers, one would expect this to reduce the rate at which posted vacancies are filled and therefore to raise the job openings rate. This limits our ability to diagnose labor market tightness based solely on the aggregate Beveridge Curve. Increasing energy prices have led to dramatic expansions of this sector, and both job openings and employment have risen substantially. There may be structural impediments that are preventing the sector from growing even more quickly than it has. However, mining and logging accounts for only about 0.5% of national employment, so even if its growth is being importantly hampered by supply shortages this cannot explain a large share of overall labor market weakness.
The data thus appear consistent with the view that the increase in job openings reflects reduced recruiting effort, lower offered wages, or higher minimum qualifications rather than labor supply shortages in fast-growing sectors. However, it is also possible that intra-industry shifts in labor demand have created shortages of some particular types of workers within individual sectors that are masked by weakness in other subsectors. This is perhaps most plausible for the information sector, where one can easily imagine shortages of workers with experience with particular technologies, or for the extremely heterogeneous professional and business services sector. Unfortunately, job openings data are not available for detailed industries. However, in Section VI I use wage data to explore the possibility of heterogeneity in labor market tightness within sectors.
V. Labor Supply Disincentives from Unemployment Insurance Extensions
We have seen little sign that shifts in the composition of labor demand across industrial sectors have been large enough to create meaningful mismatch. Another possible source of structural impediments to recovery is reductions in labor supply.
Mulligan (2011b) points to expansions in safety net programs over the recession as a potential source of such reductions.
The most prominent such program is unemployment insurance (UI Estimates calibrated from past UI research suggest that reduced job search among UI recipients contributed about 1 percentage point to the unemployment rate (Mazumder 2011) , and some commentators have argued for much larger effects (Grubb 2011 , Barro 2010 ). However, these are at best extrapolations. At this point, four years after the recession began, we have enough data to estimate the effect of UI expansions directly.
Using the uneven roll-out of the benefit extensions to generate plausibly exogenous variation in benefit durations, Rothstein (2012) finds that the total effect of UI extensions on the unemployment rate in early 2011 was only 0.3 percentage point, with more than half of this due to increased labor force participation among those who would in any case not be employed. Reductions in search effort due to the availability of extended benefits account for only 0.1-0.2 percentage point of the unemployment rate. This is far too small to create meaningful structural barriers to labor market recovery, particularly given the still-high ratio of job-seekers to job openings and the likely roll-back of the explicitly temporary UI extensions as the unemployment rate declines.
22 Mulligan (2011b) suggests that other work-discouraging benefits have increased over the recession as well, pointing in particular to implicit means-testing of mortgage modifications as a source of disincentives to work. However, there is no evidence regarding the effects of these incentives on labor supply. Rather, it appears that the reductions in homeowners' geographic mobility that many have hypothesized have been quite small (Farber 2012) . Moreover, the roughly 11 million homeowners with negative equity represent only about 10% of households in the country. 23 Even large effects on these households' labor supply are unlikely to be quantitatively important to the macroeconomy.
VI. Evidence from Wages
I argued above that claims of an important structural component of unemployment imply that labor markets are tighter than they appear: Mismatches in the distribution of labor demand and labor supply across markets defined by skill or geography would produce tightness in at least some labor markets, while labor supply shifts would imply across-the-board tightness. This tightness should be directly observable in wages: If employers are facing shortages of suitable, interested workers, they should be responding by bidding up the wages of those workers who can be found.
I examine the aggregate labor market first, then turn to distinctions across sub-markets.
VI.A. Aggregate wages
The solid line in Figure 11 . In a few states with much higher rates of negative equity -e.g., Nevada, where over half of homes with mortgages have loan-to-value ratios above oneit is plausible that mortgage modification-related incentives are reducing job search or slowing the out-migration process. But recall from Figure 7 that the labor market is extremely weak in nearly every state. To address this concern, I use the longitudinal structure of the CPS to match observations on the same individual from month m and month m+12, excluding observations that cannot be matched or where the wage is unavailable in either month and holding constant the individual weight across the two periods. 25 The dashed line in Figure 11 shows the resulting year-on-year changes in composition-adjusted mean wages. A second way to adjust for composition changes is to reweight the data to offset changes in observables among those whose wages are observed. When I reestimate the "all workers" and "composition-adjusted" series using data reweighted to the 2007 allworker age-education-race-gender distribution, results are quite similar to those in Figure   11 . The most notable change is to reduce the 2008-09 anomaly in the "all workers"
series, but the result of stable or falling wages since 2009 is unaltered.
Workers rarely accept -or perhaps employers rarely demand -reductions in their nominal wages within existing jobs. This wage rigidity may be masking trends in the wages offered to new hires. To zero in on the latter, I take advantage of the fact that the 25 Roughly 40% of initial observations lack one-year-ahead wages, about two-thirds of the time because the individual cannot be matched to a year-ahead observation (due to having moved from the original home, to survey nonresponse, or to errors in the CPS identifiers) and the remainder because the person is surveyed in the follow-up but is no longer employed or lacks a valid wage. Attrition among the continuously employed may be correlated with wage growth. The reweighting exercise described in the text partially addresses this possibility. 
VI.B. Individual labor markets
Despite the aggregate slack in 2010 and 2011 that is evident in Figure 11 , it is possible that particular labor markets were tighter. This could indicate labor market tightness, though it could also be noise due to picking out the highest of 51 imprecise measures. One way to assess this is to focus on states where other indicators suggest labor market tightness. Recall from Figure However, Figure 13 also shows a long-run upward trend in the LTU share, as at each business cycle peak since the late 1960s the LTU share has been higher than at the previous cyclical peak.
One way to assess the potential contribution of structural factors to the recent rise in LTU is to decompose this rise into components attributable to other factors and a residual that might reflect new structural challenges. 27 I focus on three factors that have been suggested as possible contributors to the rise in LTU. The first is demographic changes: Older workers have longer unemployment spells, so one might expect aging of the workforce to lead to higher LTU rates (Elsby et al., 2010) . Second, the labor market has of course been weaker in the current recession than in most past recessions, and figure 13 shows that the LTU share is clearly countercyclical. Third, any additional longrun trend in the LTU share beyond the demographic changes identified above might plausibly have continued through the current recession. For example, Autor, Kerr, and
Kugler (2007) argue that adjustment costs have risen over time. This would reduce employment flows, lengthen unemployment durations, and raise LTU shares.
I begin by computing LTU shares for each of 48 groups defined by the interaction of two gender cells, four education cells, and six age ranges. 28 Letting y gt represent the share for group g in month t, the aggregate LTU share in month t can be written as
where w gt is the fraction of the unemployed in month t who belong to group g.
Using group-specific LTU shares from January 1990 through November 2007, I
estimate a set of time series regressions of the form:
Here, UR t is the overall unemployment rate in month t and t % g represents a linear time trend that is allowed to differ for each demographic group. I use the coefficients from these regressions to compute residuals & gt in each month through 2011. Note that the residuals are by construction uncorrelated with t over the sample used for estimation of (3), but that nothing constrains their values in the 2008-2011 period that is excluded from that estimation.
Equations (2) and (3) can be used to decompose the change in the LTU share between periods t' and t: y t -y t' = $ g y gt w gt -$ g y gt' w gt'
= $ g y gt' (w gt -w gt' ) + $ g (y gt -y gt' ) w gt
The four terms in the final line of (4) represent, respectively, (i) the contribution of changes in the demographic composition of the unemployed to the LTU share, (ii) the contribution of changes in economic conditions, (iii) the impact of long-run time trends, and (iv) other changes not explained by the first three factors (including Unemployment
Insurance extensions and other policies).
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The first column of Table 2 shows the decomposition applied to the 26. An important limitation to the decompositions in columns 1 -3 is that they force the contemporaneous unemployment rate to serve as a sufficient statistic for economic conditions affecting the LTU share. If unemployment exit hazards depend on current labor market conditions, the share of the unemployed who survive in that status to six months must depend on labor market conditions over the entire six month window. This suggests that the LTU share is likely to depend on conditions in the recent past conditional on current conditions. 29 This is potentially important given the extended duration of the current labor market weakness.
To address this, I augment equation (3) with controls for the average unemployment rate over the previous six and previous twelve months. Columns 4 -6 of Table 2 Indeed, one might even expect the current unemployment rate to have a negative partial effect on the LTU share as once past conditions are controlled the primary effect of current conditions may be on the denominator of the long-term share. This is what I find when I augment equation (3) with controls for past conditions as described in the text.
discussed above: Evidently, the unusual aspect of this series in the current cycle is that it was so low in 2007, not that it was so high in 2011.
Even the specification used in columns 4-6 is quite restrictive. Most importantly, it rules out any long-run trends in the sensitivity of the LTU share to overall economic conditions. 30 There is reason to expect such trends. For example, Katz (2010) argues that employers are less prone than in the past to institute temporary layoffs during cyclical downturns. Insofar as workers on temporary layoff are recalled before 27 weeks (Katz and Meyer, 1990 ) the declining importance of this institution might plausibly have raised the cyclical sensitivity of the LTU share.
To address this, I further augment specification (3) Decompositions based on the interacted specification are presented in columns 7-9 of Table 2 . 31 The inclusion of interactions clearly raises the combined role of the two factors in explaining the 2007-2011 run-up in the LTU share. Indeed, this specification
indicates that the LTU share should have been expected to increase by 1.9 percentage 30 The specification also imposes a linear relationship between the unemployment rate and the LTU share. I have explored specifications that loosen this restriction, with little effect on the results. 31 With the interaction, the decomposition of the components due to changes in the unemployment rate versus the time trend is not unique (though the total explanatory power of the two variables is). I compute the pure UR contribution using the estimated cyclical sensitivity for June 2011, and the pure trend contribution using the June 2011 values for the unemployment rate and its lags.
points more than it actually did between 2007 and 2011, with even larger negative residuals in the longer-run comparisons.
Given the limited variation available for identification of the interacted specification, it probably should not count as strong support for the view that all of the increase in long-term unemployment in the current recession is due to the combination of exceptionally weak labor demand and long-run trends that predate the current recession.
However, it is clear that the vast majority of the increase can be so attributed. Recent policy changes and new structural impediments to adjustment (as distinct from those operating over the longer run) can be blamed for no more than a small share of the recent rise in long-term unemployment.
VIII. Discussion
The U.S. labor market is extremely weak by any historical standard: The unemployment rate has been above 8 percent for nearly three straight years, the employment-population ratio has fallen by over 4.2 percentage points since 2008, and many subgroups -particularly the young and less educated, along with racial minority groups -are facing unemployment rates well into the double digits.
Many models that macroeconomists have used to understand business cycles have difficulty accounting for demand shortfalls that last for many years. In such models, sustained high levels of unemployment can arise only if there are structural impediments to labor market clearing -either the unemployed are not looking very hard for work or they are in some sense unsuitable for the jobs that are available, either because they lack the appropriate skills or because they are unwilling to move to where the jobs are.
Drawing in part on these models, many observers have concluded that structural impediments to recovery must be an important component of our current situation. The review of the evidence here offers no support for this diagnosis, however. The most plausible sources of structural problems -labor supply disincentives due to conditional transfers like unemployment insurance or geographic immobility due to housing market frictions -do not appear to be quantitatively important. 32 And the Beveridge Curve provides at best weakly suggestive evidence regarding the state of the matching function.
Indirect evidence also fails to support the claim. Structural explanations for inadequate recovery, whether due to supply reductions or to mismatch, imply that the labor market is actually much tighter than it appears, at least as viewed from the perspective of potential employers. There is no sign in the data that employers with jobs to fill are having trouble filling them, except perhaps in a few isolated and small submarkets such as resource extraction.
Finally, the unprecedented rise in long-term unemployment, which some have pointed to in support of the structural unemployment hypothesis, turns out not to support that hypothesis after all. The extended period of labor market weakness that we have seen, combined with long-run demographic and labor market trends that predate the current recession, explains all or nearly all of the rise in the long-term unemployment share relative to past downturns, leaving no need to appeal to recent structural factors for an explanation. There is an unexplained long-run upward trend in the long-term unemployment share, which has risen by about 0.5 percentage point per year over the last two decades and also appears to have become more sensitive to economic conditions, but I find no indication that either trend has accelerated recently.
We can thus conclude that labor demand shortfalls continue to be an important feature of the labor market and the primary determinant of labor market performance, four years after the Great Recession began. (Kaplan and Schulhofer-Wohl 2011) , that any declines are concentrated among renters who should not have been directly affected by the decline in home values (Farber 2012) , and that any "house lock" effect is quantitatively small (Schmitt and Warner 2011) .
2007 state, but not to whether further increases could reverse longer-run trends toward reduced male employment-population ratios and higher inequality.
Second, although I have found no sign to date of labor market tightness, it is possible that structural problems that are now being masked by low aggregate demand would become apparent in a strong economic recovery. This bears watching as the recovery proceeds. There will likely be room for policies aimed at improving job matching -such as job training and search and mobility assistance -though these should be seen as complements rather than substitutes for policies aimed at stimulating demand. during recessions see long-run negative earnings effects (Oreopoulos, von Wachter, and Heisz 2012; Kahn 2010) and that parental job loss hurts children's schooling and labor market outcomes (Oreopoulos, Page and Stevens 2008 , Stevens and Schaller 2011 , Ananat, Gassman-Pines, and Gibson-Davis 2011 . This evidence implies that every month that unemployment remains high is making us poorer for decades to come.
Unfortunately, there is little hope of avoiding these consequences. In every month of the last 3 years, the unemployment rate has been higher than at any point since 1984. And we cannot reasonably hope for the labor market to recover quickly. Even if employment growth in 2012 and thereafter matches the pace seen in 1994 -the period of fastest sustained growth in recent history, when employment grew by an average of 321,000 jobs per month -it will still be years before we reach anything that might be characterized as full employment (Greenstone and Looney 2012) . And at a more moderate growth rate of 208,000 jobs per month -matching the best year to date of the current century -recovery will take a decade or more. Thus, while aggressive policies aimed at increasing aggregate demand quickly might help to limit the damage, even optimistic scenarios imply large ongoing costs.
Data Appendix
This appendix describes the data used for the wage analyses in Section VI. The basis for these analyses is a sample constructed by pooling the CPS Outgoing Rotation Groups (ORGs) from May 2004 through December 2011.
For hourly workers who do not report that they usually receive overtime pay or who report that their weekly hours vary, I use the self-reported hourly wage. For other workers, I use weekly earnings divided by weekly hours. Hours are constructed as usual hours on the primary job if that is available. If not, I use actual hours in the previous week if the individual had only one job and if these hours are consistent with the selfreported part-time/full-time status. Otherwise, hours are set to missing (as are wages if the hourly wage is not reported directly).
Constructed wages are topcoded at $2,884 per week, and topcoded wages are multiplied by 1.4. Wages are then adjusted for inflation using the monthly CPI-U series, and trimmed at $1 and $200 (in January 2001 dollars). Observations with allocated hourly wages (or weekly earnings, if those are used) are excluded.
Many of the analyses focus on newly-started jobs. These are identified by merging the ORG observation to the regular CPS observations in each of the three previous months. This produces a panel of up to 4 months. An individual is coded as starting a new job if he/she reported in any but the first of these months that she was in a different job than the month before or that her duties or occupation had changed, or if she moved from non-employed (and not on layoff) to employed during the panel. 
